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CONSENT AND THE PURSUIT OF
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R. George Wright*
Professor Nancy S. Kim's book' provides a carefully
considered theory of consent and a plethora of specific, useful
applications thereof. This response to Professor Kim's valuable
contribution will focus on some elements of the former, to the
exclusion of the latter. In particular, this response attends to the
crucial, but vexed, idea of autonomy and its relation to consent.
Professor Kim's project begins with recognizing an
uncertainty or ambiguity in the idea of consent. Consent may refer
to a subjective state of mind,2 or to a legal or moral justification for
some act.3 Consent often, but not always,4 is thought to require
some form of communicated manifestation.5 What, precisely, is
being communicated is a bit tricky. Presumably it cannot be the
consent itself that is being communicated, as the communicating
is often thought to be a constitutive part of the consent. But
perhaps one might say, however curiously, that consent is what it
is only by virtue of being expressed or communicated, or by being
made manifest
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1. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS (2019).
2. See id. at 5.
3. See id.
4. The relevance for consent of both a particular subjective state of mind and of
some sufficient manifested communication is contested by the philosophers. See, e.g.,
PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT (Routledge 2016) (2004); Larry
Alexander et al., Consent Does Not Require Communication: A Reply to Dougherty, 44
LAW & PHIL. 1 (2016); Tom Dougherty, Yes Means Yes, Consent As Communication, 43
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 224 (2015). These contrasting views refer to Heidi M. Hurd, The
Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996); Larry Alexander, The Moral
Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165 (1996); and Larry Alexander, The Ontology
of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PHIL. 102 (2014).
5. See NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 9 (2019).
6. By analogy, perhaps one could say that there is nothing as a genuine promise
that has not yet been somehow conveyed or communicated.
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Consent in the law is then analyzed as typically dependent
upon three required conditions.7  These conditions include
sufficient kinds and degrees of knowledge, including information
and understanding; 8 voluntariness, including intentionally and
uncoerced desire; 9 and intentional manifestation, as noted above. 10
As we explore each of these requirements, it becomes evident that
consent has a "contextual, incremental, and variable nature."11
And even if it is possible to validly consent to a particular activity,
the societal harms of that activity may still outweigh its social
benefits. If so, the activity in question is referred to by Professor
Kim as non-consentable.1 2  Consentability is, again,
contextualized, and requires considering the positive and negative
externalities flowing from a given proposed transaction.1 3
Both consent and consentability crucially implicate the idea of
autonomy.1 4 Thus "[c]onsent is concerned with the autonomy of a
particular individual,"15 while "consentability is concerned with
society's interest in individual autonomy as a value." 16 Lying
somewhere between a narrowly individual and atomistic
perspective and a broad concern for the interests of third parties
and society in general is what is often referred to as a "relational"
autonomy.' 7 Relational autonomy seeks to preserve what is
important about autonomy, but based on a non-atomistic-and
essentially socially embedded-mutual dependence.18




11. See id. at 8.
12. See NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 49 (2019).
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., id. at 74, 21.
15. Id. at 218.
16. Id. (emphasis in the original).
17. See generally Natalie Stoljar, Informed Consent and Relational Concepts of
Autonomy, 36 J. MED. & PHIL. 375 (2011); Andrea C. Westlund, Rethinking Relational
Autonomy, 24 HYPATIA 26 (2009); Catriona MacKenzie, Relational Autonomy,
Normative Authority and Perfectionism, 39 J. SOCIAL PHIL. 512 (2008); John
Christman, Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution
of Selves, 117 PHIL. STUD. 143 (2004); Natalie Stoljar, Feminist Perspectives on
Autonomy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 11, 2018), http://plato.stanford.edu/entr
ies/feminism-autonomy.
18. See Natalie Stoljar, Informed Consent and Relational Concepts of Autonomy, 36
J. MED. & PHIL. 375 (2011); Andrea C. Westlund, Rethinking Relational Autonomy, 24
HYPATIA 26 (2009); Catriona MacKenzie, Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority
and Perfectionism, 39 J. SOCIAL PHIL. 512 (2008); John Christman, Relational
Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves, 117 PHIL.
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The importance of autonomy for Professor Kim's analysis of
consent and consentability is clear. Consent is variously
instrumental to the crucial value of autonomy. Thus "consent is a
tool of individual autonomy." 19 Consent is to operate in such a way
as to "promote,"20 to "safeguard,"21 to protect,2 2 and to implement2 3
the crucial value of autonomy.
While the importance of the idea of autonomy to Professor
Kim's project is clear, much inevitably depends upon the meaning
and substance of an individual's particular understanding of
autonomy. In general, the nature of autonomy is currently murky
and contested.2 4 Helpfully, Professor Kim offers a specification of
her main intended use.
In particular, Professor Kim parses the variety of established
meanings of autonomy2 5 and distills a recurring assumption that
"autonomy means the power to act and the power not to act,
according to one's desires. Autonomy thus means freedom to as
STUD. 143, 143 (2004) (referring to "a free, self-governing agent who is also socially
constituted and who possibly defines her basic value commitments in terms of
interpersonal relations and mutual dependencies"); Natalie Stoljar, Feminist
Perspectives on Autonomy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 11, 2018),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-autonomy.
19. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 218 (2019) ("[t]he
purpose of consent is to empower individuals, to give them a tool with which to exercise
autonomy and maximize their self-interest").
20. Id. at 51, 53.
21. Id. at 53.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. For a sense of the leading contemporary approaches, see ANDREW SNEDDON,
AUTONOMY 122-23 (2013) ("autonomy of choice" versus "autonomy of person"); Marina
Oshana, How Much Should We Value Autonomy?, in AUTONOMY 99-100 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds.) (2003) (autonomy as "the condition of being self-directed, of having
authority over one's choices and actions whenever these are significant to the direction
of one's life"); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY 32 (John Christman ed.) (Echo Point Books & Media 2014) (1989) (the
autonomous person as "not merely the mouthpiece of other persons or forces"); Gerald
Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY 54, 61 (John Christman ed.) (Echo Point Books & Media 2014) (1989)
(autonomy as combining procedural independence in decision making with
authenticity); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 108
(1988) ("autonomy is the capacity to reflect upon one's motivational structure and to
make changes in that structure"); R. S. Downie & Elizabeth Telfer, Autonomy, 49 PHIL.
293, 293 (1971) (referring to the agent's "capacity to choose what to do," or to do or
refrain from a particular act). For broad normative critique, see JASON HANNA, IN OUR
BEST INTEREST: A DEFENSE OF PATERNALISM (2018); SARAH CONLEY, AGAINST
AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013).
25. See NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 53-54 (2019).
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well as freedom from."26 From among the available definitions,
Professor Kim settles, for her purposes, upon autonomy as the
"freedom to move, act[,] or think without assistance or
constraint."2 7  Generally, "a decision which provides more
opportunities and options for the consenter enhances autonomy,
while one which reduces them diminishes autonomy." 28  This
approach is then explicitly contrasted with those emphasizing
"self-actualization." 2 9
What, then, should be said about both Professor Kim's
approach to the crucial value of autonomy in the contexts of
consent and consentability, and about the value of autonomy more
generally? Professor Kim's approach is well-considered and taps
into important matters of continuing controversy.
First, consider Professor Kim's claim that, in general, a
decision that increases one's opportunities and options increases
that decision maker's autonomy. 30 This raises intriguing questions
of how to count or otherwise quantify one's opportunity and
options, and of the extent to which one's freedom or autonomy can
be reduced to matters of number, quantity, and commensurability.
Theorists are currently divided on the extent to which greater and
lesser freedom can be measured or, in particular, reduced to
enumeration or other forms of quantification. Underlying
questions of how to count the number of properly distinguishable
actions that persons can perform under given circumstances
currently remain unresolved.
Thus some contemporary writers, such Ian Carter, tend to
emphasize empirical or quantitative dimensions in measuring
degrees of freedom. 31 Other writers, such as Matthew Kramer,
26. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 54 (2019) (emphasis
in the original). It has been suggested that freedom itself always involves a triadic
relation among an actor who may be free from socially imposed restraints on action
and choice to do or not do some particular action. See Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr.,
Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312 (1967). Actions in accordance with
one's desires of course raise the problem of implanted, rationalized, or adaptive
preferences. See, e.g., Ben Colborn, Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences, 23 UTILITAS
2 (2011) (discussing the approach toward the important idea of adaptive preferences
classically taken in JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983)).
27. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 74 (2019) (emphasis
omitted); see also id. at 57 n.181, 134.
28. Id. at 74.
29. Id.
30. See supra text accompanying note 27.
31. See IAN CARTER, A MEASURE OF FREEDOM ch. 7 (1999) (defending id. at 170, an
"empirical approach to measuring freedom ... according to which the extent of my
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tend to emphasize evaluative or normative elements of our
assessments that one person or one political system is freer than
another.3 2 Perhaps the classic statement of a valuational emphasis
in comparing degrees of freedom is that of Felix Oppenheim. 33
Professor Oppenheim argued in particular that
If we believe that there is greater liberty in the United States
than in Soviet Russia, it is not ... because United States
citizens are subject to fewer regulations than Soviet citizens,
but because we are freer in those respects we value most. The
concept of a free society is, thus, essentially a valuational
one.34
Or consider a hypothetical case intended to shed light on
greater and lesser degrees of both freedom and autonomy. Imagine
two persons or the same person on two separate occasions. In the
first scenario, a person is invited to devote the next fifteen minutes
to consuming any one of seven available desserts, or else having
none of the desserts, and patiently waiting instead for the
expiration of the fifteen minutes. The person, as it happens, finds
one or two of the desserts to be distinctly appealing. Other desserts
are simply less attractive. And one of the desserts in particular
the person knows herself to be allergic to.
In the second scenario, the person has the same fifteen
minutes to cast a meaningful ballot in favor of one of the five
currently relevant political parties, all with varying ideological.
agendas, and with all of whom the choosing person has some
familiarity. Choosing not to vote is also an option. We assume that
the chooser in both the dessert scenario and in the voting scenario
has meaningful reasons for preferring at least some alternatives to
others.
Perhaps we want to say that, all else equal under ordinary
circumstances, the chooser in the political voting scenario is freer
freedom is a function of the extent of action available to me, in 'sheer quantitative
terms"'); see also Hillel Steiner, How Free?: Computing Personal Liberty, in OF
LIBERTY 73 (A. Phillips-Griffiths ed. 1983).
32. See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM ch. 5 (2003) (arguing, id.
at 425, that "to omit the evaluative component altogether is to misconstrue the import
of the 'how free' question"); id. at 472 ("the level of each person's overall liberty is partly
determined by evaluative consideration"); see also WILL KYMLIcKA, CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 142-44 (2d ed. 2001) (distinguishing the number of
impairments or exercises of freedom from the value of any such impairment or
exercise).




overall than the chooser in the dessert scenario. Perhaps we want
to say that the two are, all else equal, equally free. Or perhaps we
want to say that we simply cannot tell which of the two is freer.
The one assessment, however, that most of us would be unlikely to
make is that the dessert chooser is freer than the voter because the
dessert chooser has a total of seven options, plus not choosing a
dessert, whereas the voter has merely five, or two fewer, options in
voting or else choosing to not vote at all. And this seems so even
though the dessert choices vary significantly in their value and
degree of appeal to the chooser.
But this hypothetical focuses on questions of greater and
lesser freedom. Can we say anything specifically about chooser
autonomy, and degrees of autonomy, under the above two
scenarios? What we want to say about any greater or lesser overall
autonomy of either the dessert chooser or the voter must,
inescapably, depend on our understandings of the complex idea of
autonomy. 5
Consider, with a few further simplifying assumptions, what
the classical theorist of autonomy Immanuel Kant36 might be
willing to say about our two distinct choice scenarios. Famously,
Kant argued that the autonomous will
is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they
are rational. Freedom [or autonomy] would then be the
property this causality [of reason] has of being able to work
independently of determination by alien [or any merely
physical or biological] causes; just as natural necessity is a
property characterizing the causality of all non-rational
beings.3 7
On Kant's view of autonomy, it would seem reasonable to deny
that choosing among any number of desserts reflecting one's
decisively biologically-derived, if also culturally shaped, appetites
35. See supra text accompanying notes 13-28.
36. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(H.J. Paton trans., 1948) (Harper 1964) (1785).
37. Id. at 114; see also id. ("w]hat else can freedom of will be but autonomy-that
is, the property which will has of being a law to itself'); id. at 116 ("[r]eason must look
upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien [including
physiological or drive-based] influences"). For commentary, see CHRISTINE M.
KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 25 (1996) ("[flree will and autonomy
for Kant thus require that the will be able to act in complete independence of any prior
or concurrent causes other than our own will or practical reasoning") (emphasis in the
original).
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would ordinarily qualify as autonomous. 38 In contrast, it seems
possible to ascribe autonomy to a rational will that selects among
a limited number of political parties if that choice reflects a
rationally unverbalizable underlying maxim or principle.39 Thus
on Kant's approach, it seems possible to reflect, exercise, or
enhance one's autonomy largely in part from the sheer number of
available opportunities and options.
Second, let us briefly consider Professor Kim's emphasis on
autonomy as a "freedom to move, act[,] or think without assistance
or constraint."4 0 Perhaps we would say that a person whose choice
has then been deliberately thwarted by outside actors is thereby
made less autonomous. What if those outside actors have, to some
degree, impaired or constrained the fulfillment of a person's
otherwise autonomous choice, but in the end the chooser has
overcome the constraint and herself prevailed? Is the choice less
autonomous than it otherwise might have been? Is the chooser not
only less free but less autonomous as well?
Or consider the variety of possible forms of "assistance"" and
their effects on one's autonomy. We can imagine, say, an
exhausted runner who wishes to finish a marathon, but who
cannot do so unless she is physically carried across the finish line
by outside parties. Perhaps such assistance, especially if not
requested, would count against the runner's autonomy. But would
we also be willing to say that an otherwise autonomous chooser is
less than fully autonomous because of the assistance, solicited or
not, of all of the persons who have more generally somehow
assisted the mature chooser in developing the very capacity for
making an (otherwise) autonomous choice? Must the
developmental assistance at an advanced level of a responsible
teacher, mentor, or role model compromise, overall or on balance,
our autonomy? Or suppose two persons would like to canoe across
a river, but both realize they cannot successfully cross the river
without the active cooperative assistance of the other person. Does
their mutual assistance impair their individual autonomy? Oddly,
both parties seem to be empowered through their transaction, and
overall as free as before, if not freer. But both persons would, on
the present view, appear to become relevantly less autonomous
38. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.





precisely in assisting or, more precisely, in accepting or depending
upon the arguably liberating assistance of the other.
It would thus seem that some instances of assistance may
impair our autonomy, but that other instances of assistance may
not. We would thus need some way to distinguish autonomy-
impairing assistance from autonomy-non-impairing assistance.
But if we have such a clarifying definition of autonomy, it is then
unclear why we would need to bring any reference to assistance4 2
into the definition of autonomy at all.43
Beyond definitional matters, Professor Kim rightly
emphasizes the importance of the individual interest,4 4 as well as
the collective interest,4 5 in protecting the autonomy of the future 46
self. The focus is on the freedom of "the consenter's future self to
move, act, or think without assistance or constraint."" Acts of at
least apparent consent may lead to profound regret and to
significant damage to the chooser's future autonomy. 48
Doubtless both the individual and the society have an interest
in preventing regrettable forfeitures of future autonomy. A single
crucial choice may indeed irrevocably impair one's autonomy for
one's remaining lifetime. We all have multiple important
interests, some of which may be mutually incompatible. But
among our most important such interests, some would hold, is our
interest in sustaining autonomy itself.
Consider, though, some of the complications presented by the
classic George Bernard Shaw dramatized version of the trial of
Joan of Arc.49 Shaw's Joan vividly raises many fundamental
42. It is also possible that some instances of constraint may actually enhance both
freedom and autonomy, as is often thought to be true in the case of Mill's classic
hypothetical discussion of a traveler on foot and an unsafe bridge in JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 5, at 166 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed. 1974) (1859).
43. Professor Kim's approach to autonomy also disclaims a focus on self-
actualization. See NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 74
(2019). This usefully holds open the possibility that someone could choose and act
autonomously, yet fail, for reasons unrelated to autonomy, to fulfil what that chooser,
or some outside observer, might think of as the chooser's highest and best potential.
44. See id. at 69, 81, 84.
45. See id. at 69, 84, 88-89.
46. See id. at 57, 81, 134.
47. Id. at 134.
48. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 57 (2019).
49. See GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN (Dan H. Laurence ed.) (Penguin
Books 2003) (1924). For a detailed report, see Trial of Condemnation, JOAN OF ARC,
www.saint-joan-of-arc.com/trial-condemnation.htm (W.P. Barrett trans.).
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questions about the meaning, role, and value of autonomy in a life
well- and authentically lived.
Shaw's Joan asserts at her trial the autonomy of her own
judgment.5 0 But Joan's decisions reflect what she is supposedly
commanded to do, 5 by angelic voices heard by no one but Joan.52
When it is suggested that Joan's commanding voices emanate from
her imagination,'5 Joan responds that God typically communicates
in just that specific fashion.5 4
On the world's accounting, Joan's decision making is
pathologized and delusional, and thus hardly autonomous. She
acts, it is widely thought, out of naivete and ignorance,5 5 both of
which typically amount to fundamental barriers to meaningful
autonomy. 56 Joan does not act, ultimately, in such a way as to hold
open over time a range of earthly future options and
opportunities.57 Joan ultimately reduces her range of future
choices down to zero.5 8
In all this, Joan seems far removed from exercising genuine
autonomy. But on the other hand, the idea of severe regret 59 for
one's decisive and irrevocable choice may here seem rather out of
place. Joan does not seem to consistently regret the status of
sainthood, whatever the earthly price paid. 60 We might even think
of Joan's decision making as involving her present thoughtful, not-
merely-adaptive, autonomous deference to her perceived epistemic
authority,6 1 in the form crucially of God's authority over his
50. See GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN scene VI, at 136 (Dan H. Laurence
ed.) (Penguin Books 2003) (1924) ("Cauchon: 'And you and not the Church, are to be
the judge?' Joan: 'What other judgment can I judge by but my own?"'); but see sources
cited infra note 60.
51. See GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN 136 (Dan H. Laurence ed.) (Penguin
Books 2003) (1924).
52. See id. at 68, 136.
53. See id. at scene I, at 68.
54. See id.
55. See id. at scene VI, at 145 ("The Inquisitor: 'She did not understand a word we
were saying. It is the ignorant who suffer."').
56. Note as well the requirements of sufficient knowledge, understanding, and
relevant information for the existence of meaningful consent. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
57. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 45-46 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. See GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN 160-61 (Dan H. Laurence ed.)
(Penguin Books 2003) (1924).
61. For background, see Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 53 EPISTEMOLOGY
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Church.62 Joan is thoughtfully assigning degrees of merited and
appropriate epistemic authority, trusting in her judgments in that
respect,6 3 sharply limiting her earthly future options, 64 and
submitting to what she arguably takes to be the most trustworthy,
benevolent, and authoritative relevant commands. In important
respects, Joan's decision to go to the stake seems less than fully
autonomous. But Joan also seems to act on carefully and
authentically adopted and freely 65 endorsed reasons central to a
coherent, continuing,66 and stable, if tragic, character. 67
This discussion of Shaw's Joan of Arc is, on its own terms,
focused on the idea of autonomy. And Professor Kim rightly takes
autonomy to be central to any broader discussion of consent. It
remains only to point out that the problems of autonomy strikingly
illustrated in Joan's definitive moments of crucial choice are, as
well, barely disguised fundamental problems of consentability and
of consent, if indeed disguised at all.68 If we think of Joan's
& PHIL. 92 (2017); LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI, EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY OF
TRUST, AUTHORITY, AND AUTONOMY IN BELIEF (2012); Robert Pierson, The Epistemic
Authority of Expertise, 1994 PHIL. SCI. 398 (1994). See also R. George Wright,
Epistemic Peerhood in the Law, 91 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 663 (2017). These authorities
discuss the compatibilities as well as the conflicts between autonomy and
acknowledging relevant epistemic superiority in a given context.
62. Thus in Joan's case: "The Inquisitor: 'If the Church Militant tells you that your
revelations and visions are sent by the devil ... will you not believe that the Church
is wiser than you?' Joan: 'I believe that God is wiser than I; and it is His Commands
that I will do."' See GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN scene VI, at 135 (Dan H.
Laurence ed.) (Penguin Books 2003) (1924).
63. See R. George Wright, Epistemic Peerhood in the Law, 91 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
663 (2017); Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 53 EPISTEMOLOGY & PHIL. 92
(2017); LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI, EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY OF TRUST,
AUTHORITY, AND AUTONOMY IN BELIEF (2012); Robert Pierson, The Epistemic
Authority of Expertise, 1994 PHIL. SCI. 398 (1994).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 45-46. Somehow commensurating the
loss of autonomy associated with a broadly open (earthly) future with a single
momentous and inescapable decision to embrace the path of sainthood is rather a
daunting task.
65. Professor Kim refers to free will issues in NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY:
CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 73 (2019). Joan's elaborate metaphysics creates its own
problems of free will but allows her to bypass the limitations of sheer materialism. See,
e.g., Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (March 9, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism.
66. On the problem of reducing apparent persons to mere discontinuous selves, see
NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 73-74 (2019). See also Mary
Midgley, ARE YOU AN ILLUSION? (2014).
67. And thus in these respects apparently autonomous, on mainstream accounts.
See, e.g., Laura Waddell Ekstrom, A Coherence Theory of Autonomy, 53 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 599, 599, 614-15 (1993); sources cited supra note 23.
68. Joan is being repeatedly asked whether she wishes to consent to the dictates of
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circumstances explicitly in terms of consent, and consentability,
rather than in terms specifically of autonomy, the basic problems
noted above are largely re-inscribed in those contexts. In any
event, Professor Kim deserves our commendation for her broad-
range theoretical contributions, as well as for her multiple specific
applications of those contributions.
earthly hierarchies, religious or temporal, and to respect their binding authority. The
consent-based approach to legal and political authority is traditionally central. See,
e.g., THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORISTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON HOBBES, LOCKE, AND
ROUSSEAU (Christopher W. Morris ed., 1998). For a contemporary defense, see Harry
Beran, THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1987).
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